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COMPETITION AND EFFICIENCY IN MARKETS WITH
QUALITY UNCERTAINTY
ABHINAY MUTHOO AND SURESH MUTUSWAMI
Abstract. This paper addresses the following question: Does compe-
tition enhance eﬃciency in markets with quality uncertainty? Using the
mechanism design methodology, we characterize the maximal achievable
level of eﬃciency in such markets, and then use this characterization to
analyze how maximal eﬃciency varies with the degree of market com-
petition. We show that the relationship between them is in general a
non-trivial function of the main market parameters. In particular we
show: (i) for some set of parameter values maximal eﬃciency is strictly
increasing in the degree of market competition (although it never attains
the ﬁrst-best), but only until competition is suﬃciently intense; there-
after, maximal eﬃciency is strictly decreasing in the degree of competi-
tion; (ii) for some set of parameter values maximal eﬃciency is strictly
decreasing in the degree of market competition, attaining the ﬁrst-best
when there is no competition; and (iii) for some set of parameter values
maximal eﬃciency is strictly increasing in the degree of market compe-
tition, attains the ﬁrst-best once competition is suﬃciently intense, and
then remains at the ﬁrst-best thereafter.
JEL Classification Numbers: C7, D4, D61, D82.
“. . . most cars traded will be the “lemons,” and good cars may
not be traded at all. The “bad” cars tend to drive out the good
(in much the same way that bad money drives out the good).”
George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Un-
certainty and the Market Mechanism, 1970.
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation and Overview. It’s conventional wisdom that in general
competition is a good thing. The more the better. By fostering appropriate
individual incentives, competition can help promote aggregate (or social)
welfare. Economics textbooks are replete with models in which aggregate
welfare increases with the degree of competition. One classic example of this
key insight is provided by Cournot’s model of oligopolistic competition: in
this model, the diﬀerence between the Nash equilibrium market price and the
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constant marginal cost of production is strictly decreasing (and aggregate
welfare is strictly increasing) in the number of competing ﬁrms.
Can competition have a similar beneﬁcial impact in markets with asym-
metric information? While it’s well established that markets with asym-
metric information tend in general to be ineﬃcient (except perhaps in the
restrictive, limiting scenario when they contain an arbitrarily large number
of traders), much less is known about how the degree of ineﬃciency varies
with the degree of competition in such markets. The main objective of this
paper is to answer this question for markets with quality uncertainty, which,
following Akerlof (1970), are termed “lemons” markets.
It goes without saying that a better understanding of the relationship
between competition and eﬃciency in lemons markets is important not only
from a theoretical perspective but also from a practical (market-design and
policy) perspective. Such understanding would provide insight into the role
played by market competition on how well lemons markets function and
perform.
As is well-known, a distinguishing characteristic of the lemons market
is that when contemplating the possibility of bilateral trade, one of the
traders has relatively more information about something (eg., quality) that
aﬀects both traders’ payoﬀs from trade. Such markets are ubiquitous, and
have been intensely studied over the past three decades, both by economic
theorists and by applied economists in the context of speciﬁc markets such
as credit and labour markets. In his seminal paper, George Akerlof was
the ﬁrst to argue that lemons markets will typically be Pareto-ineﬃcient:
sellers owning high quality objects may fail to trade, although there are
buyers who would wish to trade with them. The basic intuition for this
fundamental observation stems from the incentives of the sellers owning low
quality objects: each such seller has an incentive to pretend to own a high
quality object in order to command a high price for her, actually, low quality
object.
Our central objective is to analyze how the degree of market eﬃciency
varies with the degree of market competition. We deﬁne the latter by the
exogenously given number of sellers; the higher its value the greater is the
degree of market competition. Notice that this is naturally deﬁned indepen-
dently of any speciﬁc trading rules (or game form), and the resultant market
game that such rules would induce (when combined with trader preferences,
beliefs and information structure). Market eﬃciency, on the other hand, is
a concept associated with market outcomes, but interest (and hence our fo-
cus) centers on equilibrium market outcomes, which, in contrast, do depend
on speciﬁc trading rules and/or the equilibrium concept. With any given
equilibrium market outcome is associated an expected surplus which is gen-
erated from that outcome. Following Rustichini, Satterthwaite and Williams
(1994), we deﬁne the eﬃciency of an arbitrary equilibrium outcome as the
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ratio of its associated expected surplus to the ﬁrst-best expected surplus,
where the latter is generated from the ﬁrst-best outcome.1
We shall not address the issue under consideration — namely, the rela-
tionship between the degree of competition and the degree of eﬃciency —
in the context of any speciﬁc set of trading rules. This is because doing so
would leave open the possibility that with a diﬀerent set of trading rules it
might be the case that a higher degree of eﬃciency is attained for any given
degree of competition. Instead, we characterize the maximal achievable level
of eﬃciency that is attained for any given degree of competition. As such
our approach involves considering all outcomes that can be achieved as a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of some game (induced by some set of trading
rules). In order to conduct such a normative exercise, we use the mechanism
design methodology, in which details of the trading rules are irrelevant. Of
course, this exercise is made possible by appealing to the Revelation Prin-
ciple, which allows us to conﬁne attention to direct mechanisms in which
agents truthfully report their private information.
We show that the relationship between maximal eﬃciency and compe-
tition in lemons market is a non-trivial function of the main market pa-
rameters. Our main results, some of which are brieﬂy summarized in the
subsection below, provide insight into the nature of that relationship. As a
by-product of our main results, we show that in general (and particularly for
arguably the most interesting set of parameter values) lemons markets will
not attain the ﬁrst-best outcome in the limit as the number of sellers be-
comes arbitrarily large. This speciﬁc result is perhaps not that unexpected,
although it should be contrasted with the positive (limiting) result that has
been established for markets with other kinds of asymmetric information
(such as with private values); the related literature is discussed in section
7. As noted above, our main results speak to the issue of how maximal eﬃ-
ciency varies with the degree of competition. We show that this relationship
depends in particular on two factors, namely, the likelihood of any seller
owning a lemon rather than a peach, and whether the gains from trade are
higher from trading a lemon or from trading a peach.2 For example, in the
(arguably most interesting) case when the likelihood of any seller owning
a lemon is suﬃciently high and the gains from trade are higher from trad-
ing a peach, the relationship between maximal eﬃciency and competition is
non-trivial: For relatively small lemons markets, this relationship is either
monotonic (strictly increasing or strictly decreasing) or non-monotonic, de-
pending on exact parameter values; and for relatively large lemons markets,
maximal eﬃciency is strictly decreasing in the degree of competition. One
1It may however be noted that our main results are robust to alternative deﬁnitions
of eﬃciency that capture (or measure) the “diﬀerence” between equilibrium (or realized)
expected surplus and ﬁrst-best expected surplus.
2A “lemon” denotes a low quality object, while a “peach” denotes a high quality object.
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(policy) implication of these results is that the “optimal” degree of competi-
tion — one that maximizes maximal market eﬃciency — is uniquely deﬁned
and is bounded away from being “too large”.
1.2. Summary of Main Results. Our benchmark model is the standard
one introduced by Akerlof (1970) with M buyers, N sellers and two grades
(‘high’ and ‘low’) of the good. The only source of asymmetric information
is the fact that the quality of the good owned by a seller is the private in-
formation of that seller. For this setting, we characterize the mechanism
which maximizes expected surplus subject to satisfying appropriate incen-
tive compatibility and individual rationality constraints, and being budget
balanced. It turns out that the “optimal” mechanism when M < N is dis-
tinctively diﬀerent to that when M ≥ N , as is the relationship between
maximal eﬃciency and market competition.
1.2.1. The Case of M < N . We examine the behaviour of the optimal mech-
anism as the number of sellers increases (given a ﬁxed number of buyers).
It is shown that if maximizing the expected surplus requires transferring
high quality objects to the buyers, then the ﬁrst-best cannot be achieved,
even in the limit as the number of sellers becomes arbitrarily large. Indeed,
in this case, the optimal mechanism becomes less eﬃcient relative to the
ﬁrst-best when the number of sellers is increased beyond a certain critical
number. Until that critical point, however, the relationship between maxi-
mal eﬃciency and the number of sellers is non-trivial: it can be monotonic
(strictly increasing or strictly decreasing), or non-monotonic.
In contrast, when maximizing the expected surplus requires that low qual-
ity objects be transferred to the buyers, then the ﬁrst-best outcome can be
obtained in this limit. Speciﬁcally, we show that there exists a number of
sellers such that when the number of sellers is greater than that number,
then the expected surplus from the optimal mechanism coincides with the
ﬁrst-best.
1.2.2. The Case of M ≥ N . The analysis of this case turns out to be sig-
niﬁcantly simpler in both conceptual and technical terms. Furthermore, the
results are very diﬀerent as well. We show that that if the buyers are “soft”
— which roughly speaking means that they believe each and every seller
possesses a high quality object with a suﬃciently large probability — then
the maximal eﬃcient outcome coincides with the ﬁrst-best outcome for any
M ≥ N . If, on the other hand, the reverse is the case and the buyers are
“tough,” then for any M ≥ N , the ratio of the maximal achievable level of
expected surplus to the ﬁrst-best expected surplus is a constant, strictly less
than one and independent of M and N . Thus, when the number of buyers
in the market is greater than or equal to the number of sellers, increasing
the number of sellers (while maintaining the number of buyers at least equal
to the number of sellers) does not aﬀect maximal market eﬃciency.
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1.2.3. The model with buyer heterogeneity. The negative results outlined
above raise the question as to whether there is any way of overcoming them.
We next show that if one extends the benchmark model to allow for private
information on the buyers side, then it is possible to obtain asymptotic eﬃ-
ciency under some restrictions on the parameters. One might think that in-
troducing private information on the buyers side will add to the ineﬃciency;
this, though, is not necessarily correct because the private information on
the buyers side can be used to relax the low type seller’s incentive constraint
as we discuss below.3
Let vH and vL be a buyer’s valuation for the two types of the object, and
cH and cL the corresponding seller’s reservation prices. Then, eﬃciency dic-
tates that —subject to availability— the high quality object be transferred
to the buyer if vH − cH > vL − cL and the low quality good otherwise. If
vH and vL are commonly known, then as we show later, the low type seller
has an incentive to misrepresent her type. Suppose now that there are two
types of the buyer, one for whom the net surplus from the high quality good
is more and the other for whom the net surplus from the low quality good
is higher. Then, the socially optimal decision — viz., which type of good to
transfer — depends on the type of the buyer which is unknown to the seller.
In this extended scenario, it is no longer clear that the low type seller wants
to pretend to be a high type: indeed, if the probability that a buyer is a
“low” type is suﬃciently high, then she would not want to do so. This raises
the possibility that the ineﬃciency resulting from the seller’s private infor-
mation can be corrected by allowing for private information on the buyer’s
side.
Of course, introducing two types of the buyer makes the mechanism design
problem more complex because we have to deal with additional individual
rationality and incentive compatibility constraints. We have not been able
to characterize the solution to the resulting mechanism design problem com-
pletely. However, we have been able to determine restrictions on parameters
which ensure that when the number of sellers is large enough, then we can
ﬁnd an asymptotically eﬃcient mechanism. Our results in this regard sug-
gest that while asymptotic eﬃciency in a market for lemons settings is not
a generic phenomenon, there are still signiﬁcant cases where it is possible.
1.3. Organization of the Paper. The remainder of the paper is organized
as follows. Section 2 lays down our market environment. Section 3 formu-
lates the mechanism design problem for the case with a single buyer and an
arbitrary number of sellers. Section 4 solves this problem, and character-
izes the maximal achievable level of expected surplus. Section 5 derives our
main results concerning the relationship between market competition and
maximal achievable level of eﬃciency. Section 6 considers the extension to
the case in which the buyer can be one of two types. Section 7 discusses
3This incentive constraint is the main reason for the negative results. We discuss this
in detail later.
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our results in the context of the related literature. Section 8 concludes.
Appendix A contains our technical proofs, omitted from the main text.
Appendix B extends our framework, analysis and results to the many-
buyers case. The main reasons for studying the single buyer case in the main
text, while relegating the many-buyers case to the Appendix are two-fold.
First, the analysis and the main results for the single buyer case carry over to
the many-buyers case when the number of sellers is strictly greater than the
number of buyers. In the reverse (less interesting and less important) case,
the analysis is however diﬀerent but pretty straightforward. Second, one
obtains a relatively deeper understanding of the core aspects of the analysis
and of main forces at work, and one develops sharper intuition for the main
results especially concerning the impact of competition on market eﬃciency.
2. The Market Environment
We consider a market with ﬁnite numbers of sellers and buyers in which
each seller has private information about the quality of the object (or com-
modity) that she owns. While a buyer may ascertain the quality of an object
after acquiring it, the terms of trade cannot be made contingent on quality
since that is non-veriﬁable by third parties (such as the courts).
Each of the N (N ≥ 1) sellers owns one unit of an indivisible object whose
quality is her private information. An object can be either low quality
(L) or high quality (H). The qualities of the objects owned by any two
sellers are uncorrelated. Indeed, the quality qi of seller i’s object (where
i = 1, 2, . . . , N) is considered an independent random draw from a binomial
distribution, with the probability that qi = L being α and the probability
that qi = H being 1 − α, where 0 < α < 1. Thus, there exist two “types”
of sellers: a low-type seller (whose object is of low quality) and a high-type
seller (whose object is of high quality).4
There are M (M ≥ 1) buyers in the market, all of whom are identical.
Each buyer is interested in acquiring one and only one unit of the object. We
denote by vL and vH , respectively, the reservation values placed by a buyer
on a low and a high quality object. Furthermore, cL and cH , respectively,
denote the reservation values placed by a seller on a low and a high quality
object. If a buyer acquires an object of quality q (q = L,H) at price p (p ≥ 0)
then his net payoﬀ is vq−p; and if a seller owning an object of quality q sells it
at price p then her net payoﬀ equals p− cq. If an agent does not trade, then
his net payoﬀ is zero. All agents are risk-neutral and maximize expected
utility. Throughout our analysis we maintain the following assumption on
the valuations:
Assumption 1. cL ≤ vL < cH < vH .
4In section 8 we discuss the extent to which our results and insights would be robust
to alternative distributions of the sellers’ types, including distributions that allow for a
continuum of types and/or some degree of correlation.
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The ﬁrst inequality states that there may (but need not) exist gains from
trade between a buyer and a low-type seller; the second inequality restricts
attention to the interesting and non-trivial case; and the third inequality
states that there exists gains from trade between a buyer and a high-type
seller. For notational convenience, we denote by sL and sH the surpluses
generated from trading the object of low quality and high quality, respec-
tively; that is, sq = vq − cq (q = L,H). Without loss of generality but in
order to ease exposition, we assume that sH = sL.
This completes the description of our market environment. The core
parameters include the number of sellers N , the number of buyers M , the
traders’ preferences as deﬁned by the reservation valuations vL, vH , cL and
cH , and the beliefs about quality, captured by α.
As discussed in section 1.1 above, our objective is to use the mechanism
design methodology to characterize the maximal achievable level of eﬃciency
in the market described above. We conduct this exercise by appealing to
the Revelation Principle, which allows us to conﬁne attention to direct,
incentive-compatible mechanisms.
3. The single buyer case
Before proceeding to solve the mechanism design problem for this spe-
cial case, we note that the ﬁrst-best outcome and the associated ﬁrst-best
expected surplus are deﬁned as follows. If sH > sL then in the ﬁrst-best
outcome, the buyer trades with a high-type seller unless all sellers are of low
type; symmetrically, if sH < sL then the buyer trades with a low-type seller
unless all sellers are of high type. Thus, the ﬁrst-best expected surplus is
(1) G ≡ αNsL + (1− α)NsH + [1− αN − (1− α)N ] max{sL, sH},
which is strictly increasing in N , and converges to max{sL, sH} as N tends
to inﬁnity.
3.1. Incentive and Participation Constraints. A direct mechanism re-
quires each seller to announce her type, and selects an outcome conditional
on the announcements of all sellers.5 However, without loss of generality
but in order to simplify the analysis, we restrict attention to symmetric
mechanisms; that is, mechanisms where the outcome does not depend on
the names of the sellers. A symmetric, direct mechanism can be represented
as {tHk , tLk , pHk , pLk }Nk=0, where pqk is the probability with which a q-type seller
sells her object and tqk is the expected transfer payment to her, conditional
on there being k reported high-type sellers and N − k reported low-type
sellers (q = L,H and k = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . , N).
5Formally, let qˆ = (qˆ1, . . . , qˆN ) (where qi ∈ {H,L} for any i = 1, . . . , N) be the an-
nouncements of the N sellers, and let the tuple (pi(qˆ), ti(qˆ)) represent the outcome to
seller i, where pi(qˆ) is the probability with which she sells her object and ti(qˆ) is the
expected transfer payment to her.
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Following the Revelation Principle, the mechanism needs to satisfy the
incentive-compatibility constraints (i.e., no seller must have an incentive to
misrepresent her type). We will also require the mechanism to satisfy the
participation or individual-rationality constraints (i.e., the net gains to each
seller and the buyer must be non-negative), which capture a fundamental
feature of markets, namely, that trade is voluntary. We now proceed to
deﬁne these constraints for an arbitrary symmetric, direct mechanism. In
doing so, we assume that the mechanism satisﬁes budget balance, an as-
sumption that is characteristic of markets in general; there are no subsidies
by “third” parties (such as the state).
Suppose that an arbitrary high-type seller declares that she is a q-type
seller (q = L,H), while all the other N − 1 sellers behave truthfully. If
q = H (i.e., she also behaves truthfully), then her expected probability of
trade and the expected transfer payment to her are respectively
pˆH =
N−1∑
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)
(1− α)kαN−1−kpHk+1, and(2)
tˆH =
N−1∑
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)
(1− α)kαN−1−ktHk+1.(3)
But if q = L (i.e., she misrepresents her type) then her expected probability
of trade and the expected transfer payment to her are respectively
pˆL =
N−1∑
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)
(1− α)kαN−1−kpLk , and(4)
tˆL =
N−1∑
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)
(1− α)kαN−1−ktLk .(5)
Now suppose that an arbitrary low-type seller declares that she is a q-type
seller (q = L,H), while all the other N − 1 sellers behave truthfully. If
q = L (i.e., she also behaves truthfully), then her expected probability of
trade and the expected transfer payment to her are respectively pˆL and tˆL.
But if q = H (i.e., she misrepresents her type) then her expected probability
of trade and the expected transfer payment to her are respectively pˆH and
tˆH .
An arbitrary symmetric, direct mechanism is incentive-compatible (IC) if
and only if each seller of either type does not have an incentive to misrep-
resent her type (when all other sellers behave truthfully), which is the case
if and only if the following two inequalities hold:6
tˆH − pˆHcH ≥ tˆL − pˆLcH , and(6)
tˆL − pˆLcL ≥ tˆH − pˆHcL.(7)
6The ﬁrst inequality is an arbitrary high-type seller’s IC condition while the second is
an arbitrary low-type seller’s IC condition.
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Individual Rationality (IR) for an arbitrary high-type seller and an arbitrary
low-type seller are obvious. They are
tˆH − pˆHcH ≥ 0, and(8)
tˆL − pˆLcL ≥ 0.(9)
Individual Rationality for the buyer follows the same principle: the expected
payoﬀ from the mechanism must not be less than zero, which is7
(10) (1− α) [pˆHvH − tˆH]+ α [pˆLvL − tˆL] ≥ 0.
The left-hand side of inequality (10) is the expected net payoﬀ to the buyer
from trading with an arbitrary seller.
3.2. The Mechanism Design Problem. Before stating the mechanism
design problem, we derive three admissibility conditions and state the ob-
jective function. The symmetry of the mechanism entails that pHk ≤ 1/k (for
k > 0) and pLk ≤ 1/(N −k) (for k < N). Using (2) and (4), these conditions
imply that the mechanism must satisfy the following two conditions:
(11) pˆH ≤ 1− α
N
N(1− α) and
(12) pˆL ≤ 1− (1− α)
N
Nα
.
Since the total probability with which trade occurs must be less than or
equal to one, the mechanism must also satisfy
(13) N [(1− α)pˆH + αpˆL] ≤ 1.
In order to characterize the maximal achievable level of eﬃciency, we need to
characterize the maximal achievable level of expected surplus attained across
all (IC, IR, budget balance and admissible) symmetric, direct mechanisms.
The expected surplus generated (or realized) from an arbitrary symmetric,
direct mechanism is
N∑
k=0
(
N
k
)
(1− α)kαN−k[kpˆHsH + (N − k)pˆLsL],
which equals N [(1−α)pˆHsH+αpˆLsL]. Thus, the mechanism design problem
is to choose a symmetric, direct mechanism amongst those that satisfy the
two IC constraints, three IR constraints and three admissibility constraints
which generates the maximal expected surplus. Formally, this problem is:
(14) E ≡ max
pˆH ,pˆL,tˆH ,tˆL
N
[
(1− α)pˆHsH + αpˆLsL
]
7The buyer’s expected net payoﬀ from an arbitrary symmetric, direct mechanism
(which satisﬁes budget balance) is
∑N
k=0
(
N
k
)
(1−α)kαN−k[kpHk vH +(N −k)pLk vL−ktHk −
(N − k)tLk ], which is non-negative if and only if inequality (10) holds.
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subject to (6)–(13).
Notice that this maximization problem involves four unknowns: pˆq and
tˆq (q = L,H), where the former is the expected probability with which an
arbitrary q-type seller sells her object and the latter the expected transfer
payment to her. The maximal achievable level of expected surplus is E;
and the maximal achievable level of eﬃciency is E/G, where G is the ﬁrst-
best expected surplus (and is formally deﬁned in (1)). Our main goal is to
analyze the relationship between E/G and N .
4. Maximal Achievable Expected Surplus
4.1. A Reduced-Form Problem. We solve (14) by deﬁning and solving
a reduced-form problem that involves the following change of variables:
p˜H = N(1− α)pˆH and p˜L = NαpˆL,
where p˜H and p˜L are respectively the total expected probabilities with which
trade occurs between the buyer and sellers owning high and low quality
objects. Given this change of variables the three admissibility constraints
(11), (12) and (13) respectively become
p˜H ≤ 1− αN ,(15)
p˜L ≤ 1− (1− α)N and(16)
p˜L + p˜H ≤ 1,(17)
and the expected surplus (the maximand in (14)) becomes p˜HsH + p˜LsL.
What about the two IC and three IR conditions? We ﬁrst note that the
two IC conditions (namely, (6) and (7)) are satisﬁed only if the following
inequality holds:8
pˆH ≤ pˆL,
which, using the change of variables deﬁned above, becomes:
(18) p˜H ≤
[
1− α
α
]
p˜L.
Before proceeding further, we pause for a moment to take special note of
the observation just made that incentive-compatibility implies that for any
N , the expected probability with which a high-type seller trades must be no
greater than the expected probability with which a low-type seller trades.
This observation — which generalizes to the many-buyers case studied in
Appendix B and to various other extensions of our market environment dis-
cussed in sections 6-8 — is one of the main critical factors driving our results
concerning the relationship between competition and eﬃciency. Indeed, this
is a robust feature of lemons markets, and is a crucial element that diﬀerenti-
ates such markets from markets with other kinds of asymmetric information.
8This follows by rewriting (6) and (7) as (pˆH − pˆL)cH ≤ tˆH − tˆL ≤ (pˆH − pˆL)cL, and
then applying the assumption that cH > cL.
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Returning to the problem at hand, it is straightforward to show that at
a solution to the mechanism design problem (14), the low-type seller’s IC
condition binds as does the high-type seller’s IR condition:
Lemma 1. At a solution to the mechanism design problem (14), the low-type
seller’s IC constraint, (7), binds as does the high-type seller’s IR constraint,
(8).
Lemma 1 implies that (at a solution to (14)) tˆH = pˆHcH and tˆL− pˆLcL =
tˆH − pˆHcL. Substituting for tˆH in the second equality gives tˆL = pˆLcL +
pˆH(cH − cL). Note that since cH > cL, the low-type seller’s IR condition is
automatically satisﬁed with these transfers. Furthermore, substituting for
tˆH and tˆL in the individual rationality constraint of the buyer (10), it follows
that it becomes (after using the change of variables deﬁned above, and some
simpliﬁcation):
(19) p˜H
[
sH − α(vH − cL)
]
+ (1− α)p˜LsL ≥ 0.
Now deﬁne the following reduced-form problem:
(20) E∗ ≡ max
p˜H ,p˜L
p˜HsH + p˜LsL
subject to (15)–(19).
The following lemma establishes the connection between the two maxi-
mization problems, (14) and (20):
Lemma 2. Using the change of variables defined above and the expected
transfer payments implied by Lemma 1, any solution of (20) defines a solu-
tion of (14) and vice-versa. Moreover, E = E∗.
It follows from Lemma 2 that a solution to the mechanism design problem
(14) can be obtained from a solution of the reduced-form problem (20), and
we shall exploit this result in our analysis which characterizes the maximal
achievable expected surplus, to which we now turn.
4.2. The Solution. The proposition below states the maximal achievable
level of expected surplus. Immediately after its statement, we sketch the
main elements of the argument in its support, relegating the detailed com-
putations to Appendix A (where the solution that underpins the maximal
expected surplus stated in the proposition is also derived).
Proposition 1 (Maximal Expected Surplus). Define α∗ = sH/(vH − vL),
which (given Assumption 1) lies in the open interval (0, 1).
(a) [The “Soft” Buyer Case]. If α ≤ α∗, then
E =
{
(1− α)sH + αsL if sH > sL,
(1− α)NsH + [1− (1− α)N ]sL if sH < sL.
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(b) [The “Tough” Buyer Case]. Assume that α > α∗. Define
(21) sL ≥ (1− α)
N−1
1− (1− α)N
[
α(vH − cL)− sH
]
.
[Note: There exists an N∗, where N∗ ≥ 2, such that (21) holds if and only
if N ≥ N∗].9
(i) [Large Markets]. If N ≥ N∗ (i.e., (21) holds), then
E =


α(cH − cL)sL
α(cH − cL)− (1− α)(sH − sL) if sH > sL,
(1− α)NsH + [1− (1− α)N ]sL if sH < sL.
(ii) [Small Markets]. If 1 ≤ N < N∗ (i.e., (21) does not hold), then
E =
α[1− (1− α)N ](cH − cL)sL
α(vH − cL)− sH .
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p˜L
1− (1− α)N
p˜H =
[
1−α
α
]
p˜L
p˜H [sH − α(vH − cL)] + p˜L(1− α)sL = 0
F
p˜H + p˜L = 1
B
A
1− αN
1− α
p˜H
α
Figure 1. Soft Buyer: The feasible set when α ≤ α∗
9This follows since (given the supposition that α > α∗) the RHS of (21) is strictly
decreasing in N , converges to zero in the limit as N →∞ and is strictly greater than sL
when N = 1.
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p˜H =
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α
]
p˜L
F
p˜H + p˜L = 1
A
1− αN
1− α
p˜H [sH − α(vH − cL)] + p˜L(1− α)sL = 0
B
C
p˜H
α
Figure 2. Tough Buyer and Large Market: The feasible set
when α > α∗, and inequality (21) holds (i.e., N ≥ N∗).
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[
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]
p˜L
F
p˜H + p˜L = 1
B
A
1− αN
1− α
p˜H [sH − α(vH − cL)] + p˜L(1− α)sL = 0
D
p˜H
α
Figure 3. Tough Buyer and Small Market: The feasible set
when α > α∗, and inequality (21) does not hold (i.e., 1 ≤
N < N∗).
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Proof. [Sketch of the main argument; details are provided in Appendix A.]
We begin by noting that for any α ∈ (0, 1), the set of all pairs (p˜L, p˜H) that
satisfy (15)-(18) comprises the shaded region in Figure 1. In the absence
of (19), the solution of (20) lies either at point A or at point B depending
on whether sH is strictly less or strictly greater than sL. Proposition 1(a)
follows immediately since if α ≤ α∗ then all points in the shaded region
shown in Figure 1 satisfy (19), as is illustrated in Figure 1.
Now suppose that α > α∗. In this case not all points in the shaded region
shown in Figure 1 satisfy (19). Figures 2 and 3 show how (19) aﬀects the
feasible set depending on whether or not point A remains a feasible point. If
point A does remain a feasible point (i.e., N ≥ N∗), then the shaded region
shown in Figure 2 comprises the feasible set; in this case the solution of (20)
lies either at point A or at point C depending on whether sH is strictly less
or strictly greater than sL. If, on the other hand, point A does not remain
a feasible point (i.e., 1 ≤ N < N∗), then the shaded region shown in Figure
3 comprises the feasible set; in this case the solution of (20) lies at point
D. 
Proposition 1 characterizes the maximal expected surplus that can be
generated in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE henceforth) of any market
game which is derived from grafting some set of trading rules onto the market
environment under consideration. How does this maximal achievable level
of expected surplus compare to the ﬁrst-best expected surplus? This can be
answered quite easily with the aid of Figures 1–3.
It is straightforward to see that the ﬁrst-best outcome lies at point F
(shown in Figure 1) when sH > sL, but at point A when sH < sL.10 It thus
follows that when sH > sL, the ﬁrst-best outcome can never be attained
in any BNE of any market game except in the special case when there is
a single seller and the buyer is soft (in this special case, points F and B
in Figure 1 coincide); and when sH < sL, the ﬁrst-best outcome can be
attained in some BNE of some market game provided that it is not the case
that the buyer is tough and 1 ≤ N < N∗ (in this case Figure 3 applies, and
points A and D are diﬀerent). These results are compactly stated in the
following corollary:
Corollary 1 (Comparison with First-Best). (a) Assume sH > sL. If N = 1
and α ≤ α∗ then E = G; otherwise E < G. (b) Assume sH < sL. If α > α∗
and 1 ≤ N < N∗ then E < G; otherwise E = G.
10This is because when sH > sL, in the ﬁrst-best outcome trade occurs with a high-type
seller unless all sellers are of low type; and hence the ﬁrst-best outcome has p˜H = 1− αN
and p˜L = αN . Symmetrically, when sH < sL, in the ﬁrst-best outcome trade occurs with
a low-type seller unless all sellers are of high type; and hence the ﬁrst-best outcome has
p˜H = (1− α)N and p˜L = 1− (1− α)N .
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So, in arguably the most plausible set of circumstances (when sH > sL)
and the most interesting case (when α > α∗), the ﬁrst-best outcome can
never be attained in any BNE of any market game.
We now brieﬂy comment on the implications of these results as the number
of sellers increases without bound. We have established that in this limiting
scenario the lemons market attains the ﬁrst-best outcome if sL > sH but
not if sH > sL. Thus, when ﬁrst-best optimality requires transferring the
high quality object (which would seem to be the relatively more plausible
case), ineﬃciency in the lemons market is inescapable even as competition
amongst the sellers to trade with the single buyer intensiﬁes without bound.
It may be noted that, in contrast, in markets with other kinds of asymmet-
ric information the ﬁrst-best is typically attainable in equilibrium in the
limit as the number of traders increases without bound; for example, Rus-
tichini, Satterthwaite and Williams (1994) establish such a limiting result
in markets with private values. In Section 7 we discuss the fundamental
diﬀerences between lemons markets and markets with private values which
are responsible for such diﬀering (limiting) market outcomes.
5. Competition and Efficiency
Having derived the maximal achievable level of expected surplus, we now
address the main concern of this paper, namely, how maximal eﬃciency,
E/G, varies with the degree of competition, as deﬁned by the number N of
sellers. In particular, whether, as perhaps seems intuitive, the gap between
what can be achieved in equilibrium and the ﬁrst-best outcome is decreas-
ing in the number of sellers. We derive the relationship between maximal
eﬃciency and competition by ﬁrst considering the soft buyer case and then
the tough buyer case.
5.1. The Soft Buyer Case. Suppose that α ≤ α∗. Corollary 1(b) implies
that if sH < sL then E/G = 1 for all N . What if sH > sL? Corollary 1(a)
implies that E/G = 1 when N = 1. Proposition 1(a) established that E
is constant for all N ≥ 1. At the same time, G (deﬁned in (1)) is strictly
increasing in N . Hence, if sH > sL then E/G is strictly decreasing in N ,
and converges to [(1−α)sH +αsL]/sH in the limit as N →∞. We illustrate
these results in Figure 4, and summarize them in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (Competition–Eﬃciency with Soft Buyer). Assume that α ≤
α∗. If sH < sL then E/G = 1 for all N ≥ 1. But if sH > sL then
E/G is strictly decreasing in N , with E/G = 1 when N = 1, and with
E/G→ [(1− α)sH + αsL]/sH as N →∞.
So, when the buyer is soft and sH > sL, competition does not enhance
market eﬃciency. On the contrary, it aﬀects it adversely. The reasons for
this result are as follows: While ﬁrst-best expected surplus is strictly increas-
ing in the degree of market competition, the maximal achievable expected
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(1−α)sH+αsL
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sH < sL

sH > sL
Figure 4. The competition-eﬃciency relationship for
lemons markets with “soft” buyer.
surplus is not aﬀected at all by it. Some intuition for this conclusion can
be gained from the following observations. In the ﬁrst-best outcome (de-
picted as point F in Figure 1) the total probability with which trade occurs
with the high-type sellers is 1 − αN , which is strictly increasing in N and
converges to one in the limit as N diverges to inﬁnity. In contrast, in the
maximally eﬃcient outcome (depicted as point B in Figure 1) the total prob-
ability with which trade occurs with the high-type sellers is 1 − α, which
is independent of N ; and this is partly because of the key implication of
incentive-compatibility, namely, that for any N the probability with which
a high-type seller trades must be no greater than the probability with which
a low-type seller trades.
Even in the case where α is suﬃciently small but strictly positive (i.e.,
the case where the probability that an arbitrary seller owns a high quality
object is suﬃciently large but not one), incentive constraints are unaﬀected
by the degree of market competition. It may be noted that the latter is an
important element of what distinguishes lemons markets from, say, markets
with private values in which, in contrast, the ease with which incentive
constraints are satisﬁed is increasing with the number of traders.
One implication of Proposition 2 is that maximal market eﬃciency is
maximized at N = 1. This observation implies that in the lemons market
with a single buyer and in which there is a high change that any seller would
own a high quality object should optimally be a bilateral monopoly market
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(i.e., with a single seller as well). In Appendix B we study the many-buyers
case and the results established there imply that in the lemons market with
any given ﬁnite number of buyers (and in which there is a high chance that
any seller would own a high quality object) should also optimally contain the
same number of sellers as there are buyers; having more sellers than that
aﬀects market eﬃciency adversely for the same reasons as it does in the
single-buyer case (under the assumption that sH > sL). A general message,
then, that appears to emerge from our results is that lemons markets in
which high quality objects are more likely to be owned by sellers should
optimally (i.e., to maximize maximal market eﬃciency) contain identical
numbers of sellers and buyers.
5.2. The Tough Buyer Case. Suppose now that α > α∗. Notice, ﬁrst,
from Proposition 1(b) that if sL = 0 (in which case N∗ = ∞), then E = 0;
and hence E/G = 0 for all N ≥ 1. This arises because if sL = 0 then in
order to satisfy the buyer’s individual rationality constraint there should be
no trade between the buyer and the high-type sellers, no matter how large
are the gains from trade and no matter how intense market competition is. It
should be emphasized that this conclusion is obtained under the supposition
that α > α∗ (i.e., the probability of an arbitrary seller owning a low quality
object is suﬃciently large).
Now let’s focus attention on the case when sL > 0. First consider values
of N ≥ N∗ (the case of large markets); in this case Proposition 1(b)(i) is
applicable. If sL > sH then E = G. But if sH > sL then (since E is
independent of N while G is strictly increasing in N) it immediately follows
that E/G is strictly decreasing in N ; and moreover E/G < 1 at N = N∗.
Now consider values of N < N∗ (the case of small markets); here Propo-
sition 1(b)(ii) is applicable. Over such values of N , it is easy to verify that
E is strictly increasing in N . But how does the ratio E/G vary with N?
If sL > sH , then it’s easy to verify that E/G is strictly increasing. But
if sH > sL, then it turns out that E/G is a non-trivial function of N : it
can be monotonic (either strictly increasing or strictly decreasing), or even
non-monotonic — the precise characterization of the relationship between
E/G and N is contained in Appendix A but its key features are stated in
the following proposition, which also summarizes our results for the tough
buyer case (and which are illustrated in Figure 5):
Proposition 3 (Competition–Eﬃciency with Tough Buyer). Assume that
α > α∗.
(a) If sL = 0, then E/G = 0 for all N .
(b) If sH < sL, then E/G is strictly increasing in N over values of N ∈
[1, N∗), and then E/G = 1 for all N ≥ N∗.
(c) If sH > sL > 0, then E/G is strictly decreasing in N over values of
N ≥ N∗, with E/G < 1 at N = N∗. For values of N < N∗, E/G —
which is strictly less than one — is a non-trivial function of N ; depending
18 ABHINAY MUTHOO AND SURESH MUTUSWAMI


E/G
N0
1
1 
sH < sL

sH > sL > 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
N∗

sL = 0
Figure 5. The competition-eﬃciency relationship for
lemons markets with “tough” buyer. The relationship be-
tween E/G and N on the interval [1, N∗) when sH > sL > 0
is not illustrated here since it’s non-trivial, as is summarized
in Proposition 3.
on parameter values, it may be strictly increasing or strictly decreasing or
non-monotonic. Its key features are as follows (see Appendix A for full
characterization):
• At N = 1, the value of E/G equals the value of E/G at N = 1 when
sH < sL (which is strictly less than one).
• If α < 1/2 then, depending on parameter values, E/G can either be
strictly increasing, or strictly decreasing, or non-monotonic (strictly decreas-
ing at first, achieving a minimum, and then strictly increasing).
• If α = 1/2 then E/G is strictly increasing.
• If α > 1/2 then, depending on parameter values, E/G can either be
strictly increasing, or strictly decreasing, or non-monotonic (strictly increas-
ing at first, achieving a maximum, and then strictly decreasing).
So, when sL > sH the relationship between maximal market eﬃciency and
competition is straightforward and accords with a priori intuition: Competi-
tion enhances market eﬃciency and once competition is suﬃciently intense,
the ﬁrst-best is achieved, and stays so forever after. But when sH > sL
things are much more complex when competition is not suﬃciently intense,
and moreover, the relationship does not accord with a priori intuition. The
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intuition for the relationship for large markets (N ≥ N∗) — namely, that
competition aﬀects maximal market eﬃciency adversely — is similar to that
provided for the soft buyer case (cf. Proposition 2). However, the intuition
for the relationship for small markets is complex as it depends on the in-
terplay of both incentives and individual rationality. Further insight about
this is provided in sections 6 and 7 where we report the results of numerical
simulations.
We now brieﬂy discuss the implications of our results in this tough buyer
case for the optimal degree of market competition (i.e., the degree of com-
petition which maximizes maximal market eﬃciency). When sL > sH , then
the lemons market with a single buyer and where it’s the case that any seller
would own a lemon (low quality object) with a high probability, it’s optimal
to have a suﬃciently large number of sellers (N ≥ N∗ where N∗ is strictly
greater than one). What if, more plausibly, sH > sL? In that case, the
optimal number of sellers in this lemons market is between 1 and N∗. It
can be N∗, or one, or some number in between, depending on parameters
values. It deﬁnitely is not more than N∗.
6. The Case of Two Types of Buyers
6.1. The Extended Framework. We now extend the framework studied
above by allowing for the buyer to be one of two “types,” where his type
is his private information. For reasons that will shortly become clear, we
call the two possible buyer types as “high” and “low,” and respectively
denote them by the symbols H and L. Let vwq denote the buyer’s valuation
of a q (q = H,L) quality object when he is a w-type (w = H,L), where
vwH > vwL for each w = H,L (i.e., each type of buyer prefers the high
quality good to the low quality good). Furthermore, let swq denote the social
surplus generated from trading an object of quality q to a w-type buyer;
formally, swq ≡ vwq − cq. We assume that the social surplus is maximized
by transferring the high quality good when the buyer is of “high” type, but
when buyer is of “low” type it’s maximized by transferring the low quality
good.11 That is:
Assumption 2. sHH > sHL and sLL > sLH .
As mentioned above, the buyer’s type is his private information. From
the sellers’ perspective (and hence this deﬁnes their commonly known beliefs
about the buyer’s type), the probability that the buyer is low-type is β and
probability that he is high-type is 1−β, where β ∈ (0, 1). Finally, we assume
that for each w = H,L, cL ≤ vwL < cH < vwH (which parallels Assumption
1).
A mechanism asks all agents to report their types and implements a corre-
sponding outcome. As before, we invoke the Revelation Principle to focus on
11This would be implied, for example, by a single-crossing type assumption in which the
amount of the increase in the buyer’s valuation from an increase in quality is monotonic
in the buyer’s type.
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direct revelation mechanisms which are incentive compatible. Furthermore,
we require the mechanism to satisfy both budget balance and individual ra-
tionality. A (symmetric) mechanism is a vector (pˆHH , pˆ
H
L , pˆ
L
H , pˆ
L
L, tˆ
H
H , tˆ
H
L , tˆ
L
H , tˆ
L
L),
where pˆqw and tˆ
q
w are respectively the expected probability with which an ar-
bitrary q-type seller’s sells her good and the expected transfer to her when
the buyer reports that he is of w-type.
Incentive compatibility requires that no agent has an incentive to misrep-
resent her type. We thus have, for the two types of sellers:
(22) (1−β)[tˆHH− pˆHHcH ]+β[tˆHL − pˆHL cH ] ≥ (1−β)[tˆLH− pˆLHcH ]+β[tˆLL− pˆLLcH ],
(23) (1−β)[tˆLH− pˆLHcL]+β[tˆLL− pˆLLcL] ≥ (1−β)[tˆHH− pˆHHcL]+β[tˆHL − pˆHL cL].
And for the two types of buyers:
(24)
(1−α)[pˆHHvHH− tˆHH ]+α[pˆLHvHL− tˆLH ] ≥ (1−α)[pˆHL vHH− tˆHL ]+α[pˆLLvHL− tˆLL],
(25)
(1−α)[pˆHL vLH− tˆHL ]+α[pˆLLvLL− tˆLL] ≥ (1−α)[pˆHHvLH− tˆHH ]+α[pˆLHvLL− tˆLH ].
The individual rationality constraints require that the expected payoﬀ to
any agent be non-negative. We thus have, for the two types of sellers:
(26) (1− β)[tˆHH − pˆHHcH ] + β[tˆHL − pˆHL cH ] ≥ 0,
(27) (1− β)[tˆLH − pˆLHcL] + β[tˆLL − pˆLLcL] ≥ 0.
And for the two types of the buyer:
(28) (1− α)[pˆHHvHH − tˆHH ] + α[pˆLHvHL − tˆLH ] ≥ 0,
(29) (1− α)[pˆHL vLH − tˆHL ] + α[pˆLLvLL − tˆLL] ≥ 0.
The admissibility constraints for this problem follow straightforwardly
from the observation that the planner can oﬀer a diﬀerent gamble to each
seller depending on the announcement of the buyer. We thus have:
(30) pˆHw ≤
1− αN
N(1− α) , (w = H,L)
(31) pˆLw ≤
1− (1− α)N
Nα
, (w = H,L)
(32) N [(1− α)pˆHw + αpˆLw] ≤ 1 (w = H,L).
The expected surplus generated by an arbitrary direct, symmetric mech-
anism is
(33)
N
[
(1− β) [(1− α)pˆHHsHH + αpˆLHsHL]+ β [(1− α)pˆHL sLH + αpˆLLsLL]
]
.
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The mechanism design problem is to maximize (33) subject to (22)–(32).
Before proceeding to analyze this problem, we note that the ﬁrst-best ex-
pected surplus is
(34) (1−β)
[
(1−αN )sHH +αNsHL
]
+β
[
(1−α)NsLH +[1−(1−α)N ]sLL
]
,
which is easily interpreted, as follows. When the buyer’s type is high, we
want to transfer the high quality good from one of the sellers to the buyer
except when all sellers are of low type. Similarly, when the buyer’s type is
low, we want to transfer the low quality good from one of the sellers to the
buyer except when all sellers are of high type.
6.2. Asymptotic Eﬃciency. We have not been able to characterize the
solution to the mechanism design problem for an arbitrary set of parameter
values. To address an issue that we are particularly interested in — namely,
the impact of competition on market eﬃciency — we instead focus attention
on markets with a large number of sellers, and for that case we adopt a
diﬀerent route to studying this mechanism design problem.
Observe that when the number of sellers is large, the probability of a
“mismatch” between the sellers and the buyer (i.e., the buyer is a low type
and all sellers are high type and vice versa) is small. In the limit as N
becomes arbitrarily large, we can thus ignore these two cases. Our analysis
to follow derives and analyzes the restrictions on the parameters such that a
mechanism implementing the ﬁrst-best outcome (in all cases except the two
involving a mismatch) satisﬁes (22)–(32). Hence, our results below concern
conditions under which the lemons market in the context of our extended
framework is eﬃcient in the limit as competition intensiﬁes without bound.
By comparing (33) and (34), it follows that (for any parameter values)
the values of pˆqw (q, w = H,L) given by (p¯HH , p¯
L
H , p¯
H
L , p¯
L
L), where these are
deﬁned below, generate the ﬁrst-best expected surplus:
p¯HH =
1− αN
N(1− α) , p¯
L
H =
αN−1
N
, p¯HL =
(1− α)N−1
N
, p¯LL =
1− (1− α)N
Nα
.
Now deﬁne a mechanism, which for notational convenience we denote by
µ˜, in which
(35) pˆHL = pˆ
L
H = tˆ
H
L = tˆ
L
H = 0, pˆ
H
H = p¯
H
H , pˆ
L
L = p¯
L
L.
Clearly, this mechanism fails to generate the ﬁrst-best outcome only when
the buyer’s type is low and all sellers are of high type and vice versa. There-
fore, this mechanism would be asymptotically eﬃcient. However, for any
arbitrary parameters values it will typically not satisfy (22)–(32). In the
proposition below, we establish restrictions on the values of the parameters
under which this mechanism would (in the limit as N becomes arbitrarily
large) satisfy the IC, IR and admissibility conditions. In order to simplify
the involved computations, but with some loss of generality, we adopt the
following additional assumptions about the players’ valuations:
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Assumption 3. (a) vHH > vLH and vLL > vHL; (b) vHL = cL; and (c)
cH = 1 and cL = 0.
Assumption 3(a) states that the high-type buyer values the high quality
good more than does the low-type buyer; and symmetrically, the low-type
buyer values the low quality good more than does the high-type buyer.
Assumption 3(b) states that there are no gains from trade between a high-
type buyer and a low-type seller (i.e., sHL = 0).12 Assumption 3(c) is no
more than a normalization and is made only for convenience; the proposition
below holds even if we drop this assumption.
Before proceeding with the statement of the proposition, we note that
Assumption 3, when combined with the assumption made above, one that
parallels Assumption 1, implies that:
vHH > vLH > cH = 1 > vLL > vHL = cL = 0.
We are now ready to state our main result for our extended framework:
Proposition 4. The mechanism µ˜ defined above satisfies (22)–(32) in the
limit as the number of sellers becomes arbitrarily large if
(36)
β(1− α)
α(1− β) >
vLH
vLL
.
It may be noted that the RHS of (36) is strictly greater than one, and
hence this implies that (36) holds only if β > α. This necessary condition
reﬂects the point that the likelihood of the buyer being of low-type has to
be suﬃciently large in order to provide the low-type seller with incentives
to reveal his type.
6.3. Numerical Analysis. As mentioned before, we have not been able
to characterize the solution to the mechanism design problem analytically.
However, we have been able to gain some insights through numerical anal-
ysis which suggest signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the case when the buyer’s
type is commonly known and when it is not known publicly. We illustrate
these diﬀerences by looking at the numerical solution for the following pa-
rameter values: vHH = 1.45, vHL = 0, cH = 1, cL = 0, vLH = 1.35, vLL =
0.45, α = 0.5. For this set of parameter values, Proposition 4 implies that the
approximating mechanism µ˜ satisﬁes incentive compatibility and individual
rationality as the number of sellers becomes large if β ≥ 0.75.
12This parallels the case in which sL = 0 in our earlier analysis with a single type
of buyer. There we showed, for example, that when the buyer is tough and sL = 0
then no trade ever occurs, and the best possible market equilibrium outcome is far away
from the ﬁrst-best outcome, no matter how intense competition is (see Figure 4). Indeed,
this observation may suggest that Assumption 3(b) may similarly make it impossible to
achieve the ﬁrst-best outcome in the limit as N becomes arbitrarily large. But we show in
Proposition 4 that even with Assumption 3(b), in this extended framework the ﬁrst-best
outcome is implementable in this limit provided that the probability with which the buyer
is low-type is suﬃciently high.
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The ﬁrst observation from our simulation results is that the condition
identiﬁed in Proposition 4 constitutes only a suﬃcient condition for conver-
gence to full eﬃciency. Figure 6 illustrates the relationship between market
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Figure 6. Market eﬃciency v/s Number of sellers for β = 0.55
eﬃciency and the number of sellers for β = 0.55. Here, the market con-
verges to eﬃciency when N ≥ 13. Incidentally, β = 0.55 appears to be the
smallest value for which convergence to full eﬃciency obtains; furthermore,
if we choose β ≥ 0.75, then convergence to full eﬃciency obtains for N = 2.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
Figure 7. Market eﬃciency v/s Number of sellers for β = 0.5
The second observation, illustrated in Figure 7, is that increasing the
number of sellers can increase market eﬃciency even if there is no conver-
gence to full eﬃciency. This is in contrast to what we saw in the case where
the buyer’s type was common knowledge: there, except for one case, in-
creasing the number of sellers had either a negative impact or no impact
whatsoever on market eﬃciency.
The third observation, illustrated in Figure 8, is that the convergence
towards full or partial eﬃciency may not be monotonic. We have not been
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Figure 8. Market eﬃciency v/s Number of sellers for β = 0.4
able to explain this non-monotone behaviour; obviously, further work is
needed to understand what is going on here.
7. Discussion and Related Literature
In the context of markets with asymmetric information, the relationship
between competition and market eﬃciency has been examined for the private
values case, which concerns trade in a homogenous object.13 It is instructive
to compare our results with those obtained there.
7.1. Asymptotic eﬃciency. Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2003) note that
asymptotic eﬃciency has been established under very general conditions for
the private values case. Indeed, in some papers—for example, Rustichini,
Satterthwaite and Williams (1994) and Tatur (2004)—the concern has gone
beyond establishing asymptotic eﬃciency to looking at the rate of conver-
gence to eﬃciency. In contrast, in our benchmark model, we obtain as-
ymptotic eﬃciency only in the case when the incentive constraint pˆH ≤ pˆL
does not bind. The failure to obtain asymptotic eﬃciency is related to the
fact that the incentive constraint pˆH ≤ pˆL is independent of the number of
sellers; it therefore follows that when this constraint binds, ineﬃciency will
always be present. In contrast, Gresik and Satterthwaite (1989) establish
that in the private values case, the incentive constraint of a seller (buyer)
weakens as the number of sellers (buyers) increases.
One can understand the diﬀerence in the two situations as follows. In the
private values case, ineﬃciency results solely as a result of some proﬁtable
trades not taking place.14 In the market for lemons, there is an additional
13See, for example, the papers of Gresik and Satterthwaite (1989), Satterthwaite and
Williams (1989), Williams (1991), Rustichini, Satterthwaite and Williams (1994), and
Tatur (2004).
14There is, of course, the possibility of a “wrong” kind of trade wherein a seller with
a higher reservation price sells his object in preference to a seller with a lower reservation
price. A similar possibility exists on the buyers side too. Note though that such a trade
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source of ineﬃciency—viz., trade involving the “wrong” type of object. More
precisely, it being ineﬃcient to transfer a low quality object when it is opti-
mal to transfer the high quality object. Competition amongst sellers helps
in overcoming the ﬁrst type of ineﬃciency but not the second. It is worth
noting that we obtain asymptotic eﬃciency only when the second source of
ineﬃciency is not present.
7.2. Non-monotonicity. One important aspect of our results, both in
the benchmark and the extended models, is that eﬃciency may be a non-
monotonic function of the number of sellers. It is not easy to provide eco-
nomic intuition for this result. In the benchmark model, non-monotonicity
arises when the probability that each seller owns a lemon is high enough
so that the high quality object cannot be transferred with probability one
even when all traders report that they have high quality objects.15 When
one adds additional sellers, the achievable expected surplus increases be-
cause the probability that all traders have high quality objects decreases.
However, the ﬁrst-best level of expected surplus also increases, and so it is
not clear what happens to maximal eﬃciency (i.e., the ratio of the maxi-
mal achievable level of surplus to the ﬁrst-best surplus). As we showed in
Proposition 3, the behaviour of this ratio depends on whether α is bigger,
equal to or less than 0.5. Note that this non-monotonicity result persists in
the extended model as well, though the reasons for this behaviour in that
model are less clear. There is no equivalent of this non-monotonicity result
in the private values case.
7.3. Impact of market size. Our analysis for the most part involves hold-
ing the number of buyers constant while changing the number of sellers. In
contrast, the literature in the private values case has considered the more
traditional replication scenario, where the number of buyers and sellers are
both varied while keeping the buyer-seller ratio constant. We have been
able to derive only limited results with regard to the impact on eﬃciency
of changing the market size for our benchmark model. If we start from a
scenario where N ≤ M (the number of buyers is more than the number of
sellers), then our analysis shows that replicating this economy has no impact
on market eﬃciency. On the other hand, if we start from a scenario where
M < N and sH > sL then our analysis shows that replicating this setup
will not lead to asymptotic eﬃciency. It appears diﬃcult saying anything
more because the feasible set (in the (p˜H , p˜L) space) changes.16 It is thus
diﬃcult determining the behavior of the eﬃciency ratio. Note though, that
can occur only if a seller (buyer) understates (overstates) her valuation. Such a strategy
is never in the trader’s own interest.
15This is the case illustrated in Figure 3.
16As an example, consider Figure 12 which concerns the case M < N and α ≤ α∗. If
we increase both M and N while keeping M/N constant, then the following happens: (i)
the line p˜H + p˜L = M shifts outward, (ii) the lines p˜H = N(1 − α)bH and p˜L = NαbL
shift outward.
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in the case M < N we showed that asymptotic eﬃciency could be obtained
only when sL > sH and N increases while holding M constant. Intuitively,
therefore, we would not expect an increase in the market size to enhance
eﬃciency. This is what our simulation results suggest, some of which we
report below to illustrate the diﬀerent possibilities regarding the behavior
of the eﬃciency ratio. These simulations have been done starting with an
initial setting of M = 1, N = 2 and cH = 2, cL = 1.
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Figure 9. Market eﬃciency v/s Market size when sH > sL
illustrating decreasing eﬃciency with increasing market size
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Figure 10. Market eﬃciency v/s Market size when sH > sL
illustrating non-monotonic behaviour of the eﬃciency ratio
Figures 9 and 10 both concern the case when sH > sL. Both illustrate
that in this case, increasing the market size actually makes the market less
eﬃcient. Figure 10 suggests that there may be an initial phase when the
eﬃciency of the market increases, which reinforces our earlier point about
non-monotonicity.17
17The parameters used in Figure 9 are α = 0.35, vH = 2.2.5, vL = 1.15 and in Figure
10, α = 0.75, vH = 2.25, vL = 1.1.
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The last simulation considers the case of M < N and sL > sH . Note that
if the ﬁrst-best is achievable for the given (M,N), then clearly it will be
achievable in the replicated economy as well. If the ﬁrst-best is not achiev-
able in the initial setting, then it may not be obtainable in the replicated
economy as shown in Figure 11.18
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Figure 11. Market eﬃciency v/s Market size when sL > sH
7.4. Relationship to the literature on the market for lemons. The
literature on the market for lemons is too large to be summarized here; we
conﬁne ourselves to discussing those papers which have a direct bearing on
our paper. The use of the mechanism design methodology in our benchmark
model can be regarded as a direct follow-up to the work of Samuelson (1984)
who studied the bilateral lemons problem; our extension consists of analyz-
ing the general case of ﬁnite but arbitrary number of sellers and buyers.19
The ineﬃciency pointed to by Akerlof (1970) has prompted economists
to examine ways by which this ineﬃciency can be overcome. For instance,
Klein and Leﬄer (1981) and Tirole (1996) have suggested that repeated
interactions may overcome the adverse selection problem; on another di-
mension, the works of Hendel and Lizzeri (1999), Janssen and Roy (2002)
and Hendel, Lizzeri and Siniscalchi (2004) suggest that particular features
of the durable goods market, when taken into account, can overcome par-
tially or even fully the ineﬃciency associated with the lemons market.20 Our
extended model is in the same spirit as these papers; however, there are two
diﬀerences. Firstly, the other papers mostly use models with a continuum
of agents; their models cannot therefore directly address the question of
interest to us which is the impact of competition on market eﬃciency. In
18Note that for this case, we showed that if the number of buyers is kept constant, then
eﬃciency is achieved for suﬃciently large N . The parameters used are vL = 1.15, vH =
2.05 and α = 0.35.
19See also Evans (1989), Vincent (1989), and Manelli and Vincent (1995).
20Note that the motivating example used by Akerlof in his seminal paper was the
‘market for second hand cars’ which suggests a durable good.
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this context, note that in our extended model, we need private information
on the buyers’ side as well as a large number of sellers to obtain eﬃciency.
Secondly, in contrast to the other papers which use the dynamic element,
our extended model is still a static one and as such, closer to the basic Ak-
erlof model. Our results thus show that it is possible to obtain asymptotic
eﬃciency even in markets for non-durable goods and without using repeated
game eﬀects.
8. Concluding Remarks
We end by discussing the sensitivity of our results to the particular spec-
iﬁcation of our model. One issue concerns our use of a ﬁnite type space: we
assume that both sellers and buyer can be of one of two types. We think
that variants of our results can be proved for the continuum type case, but
this will require diﬀerent techniques to that used here; we intend pursuing
this route in future work.
A second issue concerns our assumption that sellers types are indepen-
dent. One might ask, if by allowing for correlation, one can obtain positive
results as in Cre´mer and McLean (1988). They showed that if agents’ types
are correlated in a Bayesian mechanism, then one can construct a two-stage
‘augmented mechanism’ which implements the same outcome as the origi-
nal mechanism, but where all agents’ informational rents are driven down to
zero. This fact can be used to implement eﬃcient outcomes in some circum-
stances provided the eﬃcient outcome is implementable without requiring
budget balance: essentially, one can construct an ‘augmented mechanism’
which recovers from the agents the implicit subsidy needed to implement
the eﬃcient outcome. Thus, the key to seeing whether correlation amongst
sellers’ types can help in our context is to see whether we can implement the
eﬃcient outcome if we do not require individual rationality and/or budget
balance. Note, however, that incentive compatibility by itself requires that
pˆH ≤ pˆL and this condition implies ineﬃciency whenever sH > sL. There-
fore, the ﬁrst-best outcome is unimplementable even if we are willing to give
up budget balance and individual rationality and this shows that correlation
amongst sellers’ types in unlikely to change the nature of our results.
Appendix A: Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. The lemma can be established using standard techniques.
Here is an outline of the argument:
(I) Incentive Compatibility implies that pˆH ≤ pˆL: We can write (6) and (7) as
(pˆH − pˆL)cH ≤ tˆH − tˆL ≤ (pˆH − pˆL)cL.
The result follows since cH > cL.
(II) For each type of seller, either her incentive compatibility constraint binds or
her individual rationality constraints binds: Suppose, to the contrary, that neither
(6) nor (8) bind for the high-type seller. Then, one can increase the expected
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surplus by increasing pˆH and lowering tˆH without violating incentive compatibility
or individual rationality. The same argument applies with respect to the low-type
seller.
(III) It cannot be the case that both incentive compatibility constraints bind: Sup-
pose, to the contrary, that this is the case. Then, neither individual rationality
constraint can bind. We can thus increase the expected surplus by increasing pˆH
and pˆL both by  > 0 and decreasing tˆH and tˆL both by δ > 0. Note that these
changes do not aﬀect the incentive compatibility constraints. If  and δ are small
enough, then the individual rationality constraints are unaﬀected.
(IV) It cannot be the case that the high-type seller’s incentive compatibility con-
straint and the low-type seller’s individual rationality constraint bind : Suppose, to
the contrary, that this is the case. Then, we have tˆH = tˆL +(pˆH − pˆL)cH = pˆLcL +
(pˆH − pˆL)cH . Therefore, tˆH − pˆHcH = pˆLcL +(pˆH − pˆL)cH − pˆHcH = pˆL(cL− cH).
Since cL < cH , this implies that we must have pˆL = 0, which in turn implies that
pˆH = 0, and via the incentive compatibility constraints, that tˆH = tˆL. This implies
that both incentive compatibility constraints bind, a contradiction.
Hence, at a solution to (14), inequalities (7) and (8) will be binding constraints.
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose that (pˆH , pˆL, tˆH , tˆL) solves the mechanism design
problem (14). Then, p˜H = N(1 − α)pˆH and p˜L = NαpˆL satisfy (15)–(19), and so
E ≤ E∗. Now suppose that (p˜H , p˜L) solves the reduced-form mechanism design
problem (20). Deﬁne pˆH = p˜H/N(1 − α), pˆL = p˜L/Nα, tˆH = pˆHcH , and tˆL =
pˆLcL + pˆH(cH − cL). It is straightforward to verify that (pˆH , pˆL, tˆH , tˆL) satisﬁes
(6)–(13), and hence E∗ ≤ E. Therefore E = E∗.
Proof of Proposition 1. In the proof of this proposition stated in the text
(immediately after the statement of the proposition) we sketched the main elements
of the argument. Here we provide a fuller argument, with attention being focused
on the main omitted computations. We conveniently break our argument into two
main cases, depending on whether Z is negative or positive, where
Z ≡ sH − α(vH − cL)
is the coeﬃcient of p˜H in (19). First consider the case when Z ≥ 0 (i.e., α <
sH/(vH − cL)).21 In this case (19) can be rewritten as
p˜H ≥
[
−(1− α)sL
Z
]
p˜L,
and hence (since Z ≥ 0) the feasible set of the maximization problem (20) is the
shaded region in Figure 1. It thus follows that in this case the unique solution of
(20) is at point B if sH > sL and at point A if sH < sL, i.e.,
(p˜L, p˜H) =
{
(α, 1− α) if sH > sL,
(1− (1− α)N , (1− α)N ) if sH < sL.
21It may be noted that sH/(vH − cL) < α∗, and hence this case refers to part (a) of
the proposition.
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Now consider the case when Z < 0 (i.e., α > sH/(vH − cL)). In this case (19) can
be rewritten as
p˜H ≤
[
−(1− α)sL
Z
]
p˜L.
Notice that in this case the line
(A.1) p˜H =
[
−(1− α)sL
Z
]
p˜L
is positively sloped; whereas in the previous case when Z ≥ 0, the line (A.1) was
non-positively sloped. There are three subcases to consider here, depending on the
relative position of the line (A.1).
If the slope of the line (A.1) is greater than or equal to (1 − α)/α — which is
the case if and only if α ≤ α∗ — then (A.1) lies above the line p˜H = [(1−α)/α]p˜L,
and hence the feasible set of the maximization problem (20) in this case [when
α ∈ (sH/(vH − cL), α∗)] continues to be the shaded region in Figure 1. It thus
follows that in this case the unique solution of (20) is the same as for the case
above when α < sH/(vH − cL).
Now suppose that α > α∗ — which means that the line (A.1) lies below the line
p˜H = [(1 − α)/α]p˜L. This is shown in Figures 2 and 3, depending on whether it
intersects the line p˜H + p˜L = 1 to the left of (or at) point A or to the right of point
A. After some simpliﬁcation, it can be shown that the former is the case if and only
if inequality (21) holds; and that the latter is the case if and only if (21) does not
hold — notice that Proposition 1(b)(i) concerns the former case while Proposition
1(b)(ii) the latter.
When (21) holds, the unique solution of (20) lies, as shown in Figure 2, at point
C if sH > sL and at point A if sH < sL, i.e.,
(p˜L, p˜H) =


[ −Z
(1− α)sL − Z ,
(1− α)sL
(1− α)sL − Z
]
if sH > sL,
(1− (1− α)N , (1− α)N ) if sH < sL.
When (21) does not hold, then the unique solution of (20) lies, as shown in Figure
3, at point D, i.e.,
p˜L = 1− (1− α)N and p˜H =
[
−(1− α)sL
Z
]
[1− (1− α)N ].
Proof of Proposition 3. Here we provide a full characterization of the competition-
eﬃciency relationship when α > α∗, sH > sL > 0 and N ∈ [1, N∗). Maximal eﬃ-
ciency is E/G where, for this set of parameter values, E is deﬁned in Proposition
1(b)(ii) and it follows from (1) that G = αNsL + (1− αN )sH .
It’s straightforward to show that since dE/dN > 0 and dG/dN > 0,
d(E/G)
dN
 0 iﬀ G
dG/dN
 E
dE/dN
.
Hence, after substituting for E, dE/dN , G and dG/dN , simplifying and re-arranging
terms, we obtain that
d(E/G)
dN
 0 iﬀ
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(A.2)
[
α
1− α
]N

[
1− ln(1− α)
lnα
]
αN +
[
ln(1− α)
lnα
][
sH
sH − sL
]
.
We now divide the rest of argument into three cases, depending on whether α
equals, or is less than, or is greater than 1/2.
Case 1 : α = 1/2. In this case, (A.2) reduces to
1  sH
sH − sL .
Hence it follows that E/G is strictly increasing in N over the interval [1, N∗).
Case 2 : α > 1/2. In this case, the RHS of (A.2) is strictly decreasing while the
LHS is strictly increasing (in N). This gives rise to two subcases:
(i) At N = 1, the LHS of (A.2) is strictly greater than the RHS of (A.2). In this
subcase, the LHS is strictly greater than the RHS for all N , and hence it follows
that E/G is strictly decreasing in N over the interval [1, N∗).
(ii) At N = 1, the LHS of (A.2) is less than or equal to the RHS of (A.2). In
this subcase, there exists an N˜ ≥ 1 such that LHS  RHS if and only if N  N˜ .
This implies that if N˜ ≥ N∗ then E/G is strictly increasing in N over the interval
[1, N∗). But if N˜ < N∗ then E/G is non-monotonic in N over the interval [1, N∗):
it’s strictly increasing over [1, N˜), achieves local maximum at N˜ and is strictly
decreasing over (N˜ ,N∗).
Case 3 : α < 1/2. In this case, the RHS of (A.2) is strictly increasing while the
LHS is strictly decreasing (in N). This gives rise to two subcases:
(i) At N = 1, the RHS of (A.2) is strictly greater than the LHS of (A.2). In this
subcase, the RHS is strictly greater than the LHS for all N , and hence it follows
that E/G is strictly increasing in N over the interval [1, N∗).
(ii) At N = 1, the RHS of (A.2) is less than or equal to the LHS of (A.2). In
this subcase, there exists an Nˆ ≥ 1 such that RHS  LHS if and only if N  Nˆ .
This implies that if Nˆ ≥ N∗ then E/G is strictly decreasing in N over the interval
[1, N∗). But if Nˆ < N∗ then E/G is non-monotonic in N over the interval [1, N∗):
it’s strictly decreasing over [1, Nˆ), achieves local minimum at Nˆ and is strictly
increasing over [Nˆ ,N∗).
Proof of Proposition 4. The mechanism µ˜ leaves unspeciﬁed the transfers tˆHH
and tˆLL. So, let us deﬁne tˆ
H
H = p¯
H
HcH + δ for some δ ≥ 0 and tˆLL = p¯LLvLL − γ for
some γ ≥ 0. Given these transfers and the mechanism µ˜, we now have a completely
speciﬁed (symmetric, direct) mechanism, which of course varies as δ and/or γ vary.
Our analysis below will show that if the parameters satisfy (36) then (in the limit
as N tends to inﬁnity) there exists a δ ≥ 0 and a γ ≥ 0 such that this mechanism
satisﬁes the four IC conditions and four IR conditions. This would then establish
the proposition.
First, we note that (by deﬁnition) this mechanism satisﬁes the IR condition of the
high-type seller (namely, (26)) and the IR condition of the low-type buyer (namely,
(29)). Furthermore, it’s easy to verify that the high-type seller’s IC condition (22)
is also satisﬁed since (by assumption) cH > vLL.
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Now making use of Assumption 3, it’s easy to verify that if the mechanism sat-
isﬁes the low-type seller’s IR condition (27) and the high-type buyer’s IR condition
(28), then it would also satisfy the high-type buyer’s IC condition (24). Hence,
given the observations made so far, we now need to explore whether or not there
exists δ ≥ 0 and γ ≥ 0 that satisfy the low-type seller’s and the low-type buyer’s
IC conditions ((23) and (25)), and the low-type seller’s and high-type buyer’s IR
conditions ((27) and (28)). After substituting for the mechanism µ˜ with the trans-
fers speciﬁed above (and making use Assumption 3), conditions (23), (25), (27) and
(28) respectively become:
z1 −
[
1− β
β
]
δ ≥ γ(A.3)
z2 −
[
1− α
α
]
δ ≤ γ(A.4)
p¯LLvLL ≥ γ(A.5)
p¯HH(vHH − 1) ≥ δ, where(A.6)
z1 = p¯LLvLL −
[
1− β
β
]
p¯HH and z2 =
[
1− α
α
]
p¯HH(vLH − 1).
We now divide the argument according to whether z2 > z1 or z1 > z2.
First consider the case in which z2 > z1. It’s straightforward to verify that there
exists δ ≥ 0 and γ ≥ 0 satisfying (A.3)–(A.6) if and only if
βz1
1− β >
αz2
1− α.
Note that since z2 > 0, the latter condition implies that z1 > 0. It may also be
noted that our claim follows since (given the assumption that vHH > vLH) it is
always the case that
αz2
1− α < p¯
H
H(vHH − 1).
Now, after substituting for the values of z1 and z2 — and in the process sub-
stituting for the values of p¯HH and p¯
L
L in z1 and z2 — it’s thus straightforward to
show that the existence of a δ ≥ 0 and γ ≥ 0 is assured in the limit as N tends to
inﬁnity if and only if the parameters satisfy the following condition:
(A.7)
vLH
vLL
<
β(1− α)
α(1− β) <
1
sLL − sLH .
This deﬁnes a non-empty set of parameter values.
We now turn attention to the case in which z1 > z2. It’s straightforward to
verify that there exists δ ≥ 0 and γ ≥ 0 satisfying (A.3)–(A.6) if and only if
Either (i)
βz1
1− β >
αz2
1− α,
Or (ii)
βz1
1− β <
αz2
1− α and p¯
L
LvLL ≥ γ, where
γ =
(1− β)(1− α)
β − α
[
βz1
1− β −
αz2
1− α
]
.
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Note that the ﬁrst inequality in part (ii) implies (since z1 > z2) that α > β, which,
in turn, means that γ > 0. It however turns out that in the limit as N tends to
inﬁnity, the second inequality in part (ii) holds (given that here α > β) if and only
if vLH < vLL, which is inconsistent with our maintained assumption. Hence, in
this limit the conditions in part (ii) (in conjunction of course with the hypothesis
of this case that z1 > z2) cannot all be satisﬁed.
This means that in the limit as N tends to inﬁnity, we obtain (after substituting
for the values of z1 and z2; and in the process substituting for the values of p¯HH and
p¯LL in z1 and z2) that the existence of a δ ≥ 0 and γ ≥ 0 is assured if and only if the
parameters satisfy the following condition (which relates to part (i) in conjunction
of course with the hypothesis of this case that z1 > z2):
(A.8)
β(1− α)
α(1− β) >
1
sLL − sLH .
This deﬁnes a non-empty set of parameter values. The Proposition follows imme-
diately by combining (A.7) and (A.8).
Appendix B: Generalization to the Many-Buyers Case
In this appendix we extend our analysis to the case in which the market has an
arbitrary number M of buyers. It turns out that the analysis for the case when
M < N is essentially identical to the analysis conducted in the text of the single
buyer case; and the main results obtained above for the single buyer case carry
over to this case. The analysis and results for the case when M ≥ N are however
diﬀerent.
The only diﬀerence between the mechanism design problem with M = 1, as
stated in (14), and the problem with an arbitrary number M of buyers concern
the three admissibility conditions. For any M , the symmetry of the mechanism
now entails that pHk ≤ min{1,M/k} (for k > 0) and pLk ≤ min{1,M/(N − k)} (for
k < N). Using (2) and (4), these conditions imply that the mechanism must satisfy
the following two conditions:
(B.1) pˆH ≤
N−1∑
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)
(1− α)kαN−1−k min
{
1,
M
k + 1
}
and
(B.2) pˆL ≤
N−1∑
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)
(1− α)kαN−1−k min
{
1,
M
N − k
}
Furthermore, since the expected number of objects transferred to the buyers must
be less than or equal to min{M,N}, the mechanism must also satisfy
(B.3) N [(1− α)pˆH + αpˆL] ≤ min{M,N}.
We can now formally state the mechanism design problem for an arbitrary M
and arbitrary N ; it is as follows:
(B.4) E ≡ max
pˆH ,pˆL,tˆH ,tˆL
N
[
(1− α)pˆHsH + αpˆLsL
]
subject to (6)–(10) and (B.1)–(B.3).
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The Case of M < N. We solve the mechanism design problem (B.4) in this case
in exactly the same manner as we did above for the case when M = 1. The only
diﬀerence is that now the three admissibility constraints (B.1), (B.2) and (B.3)
respectively become (using the same change of variables)
(B.5) p˜H ≤ N(1− α)bH ,
(B.6) p˜L ≤ NαbL and
(B.7) p˜L + p˜H ≤M,
where bH and bL respectively denote the right-hand sides of (B.1) and (B.2). Hence,
the mechanism design problem (B.4) for the case when M < N can be solved by
instead solving the following reduced-form problem:
(B.8) E ≡ max
p˜H ,p˜L
p˜HsH + p˜LsL
subject to (18)–(19) and (B.5)–(B.7) .
With the aid of Figures 12–14 — which parallel Figures 1–3 — it’s relatively easy
to characterize the solution to (B.8) by using exactly the same arguments to those
used in establishing Proposition 1.22 As such it’s easy to obtain a proposition that
characterizes the maximal achievable level of expected surplus, a proposition that
would parallel (and look very similar to) Proposition 1. Since nothing signiﬁcantly
new is obtained over and above the arguments, results and insights derived and
discussed in the single buyer case, we instead proceed to discuss the robustness
(or otherwise) of the results in Propositions 2 and 3 (illustrated in Figures 4 and
5 respectively) concerning the “competition-eﬃciency” relationship when there are
an arbitrary number of buyers, but whose number M is strictly less than N .
In discussing the impact of the degree of competition on the maximal achievable
level of eﬃciency, we keep M ﬁxed at some arbitrary level and allow N to vary
over the set {M + 1,M + 2, . . .}. First we consider the case when the buyers are
soft (and hence we address the robustness or otherwise of the results in Proposition
2). We ﬁrst note that when sL > sH then point A in Figure 12 depicts both
the ﬁrst-best outcome and the outcome associated with the maximal achievable
expected surplus. On the other hand, when sH > sL then point F depicts the ﬁrst-
best outcome while point B the outcome associated with the maximal achievable
expected surplus. Since point B is unaﬀected by N while point F moves upwards
along the p˜H + p˜L = M line, where the former means that the maximal achievable
expected surplus is independent of N while the latter means that ﬁrst-best expected
surplus is increasing in N , we obtain that maximal eﬃciency is decreasing in N
(for a ﬁxed M < N). In conclusion, the competition-eﬃciency relationship when
M < N and the buyers are soft is as illustrated in Figure 4.
Now consider the case when the buyers are tough (and hence we address the
robustness or otherwise of the results in Proposition 3). If sL = 0 then E = 0 for
exactly the same reasons as in the single buyer case. Now suppose the sL > 0.
Just like in the single buyer case it can be shown that point C lies above point
22It should be noted that both bH and bL are bounded from below by M/N . Fur-
thermore, bH and bL are respectively bounded from above by M(1 − αN )/N(1 − α) and
M [1− (1− α)N ]/Nα.
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p˜H [sH − α(vH − cL)] + p˜L(1− α)sL = 0
F
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A
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p˜H + p˜L = M
NαbLMα
N(1− α)bH
M(1− α)
Figure 12. The feasible set when M < N and α ≤ α∗.
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B
C
p˜H
N(1− α)bH
M(1− α)
Mα NαbL
p˜H + p˜L = M
Figure 13. The feasible set when M < N , α > α∗ and
point C lies above point A.
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p˜L
p˜H =
[
1−α
α
]
p˜L
F
B
A
p˜H [sH − α(vH − cL)] + p˜L(1− α)sL = 0
D
p˜H
p˜H + p˜L = M
Mα NαbL
M(1− α)
N(1− α)bH
Figure 14. The feasible set when M < N , α > α∗ and
point C, which is not shown, lies below point A.
A (and hence Figure 13 applies) when N ≥ N∗, where N∗ ≥ 2; and that C lies
below A (and hence Figure 14 applies) when N < N∗. The rest of the argument
is similar to the argument supporting Proposition 3 and hence the competition-
eﬃciency relationship when M < N and the buyers are tough is as illustrated in
Figure 4.
The Case of M ≥ N. Since M ≥ N , it follows that bH = bL = 1 (i.e., it is possible
for all sellers to sell their objects since the total number of buyers exceeds the
number of sellers). Hence, the admissibility conditions (B.1) and (B.2) respectively
become
(B.9) pˆH ≤ 1 and
(B.10) pˆL ≤ 1.
Since M ≥ N the admissibility condition (B.3) becomes:
(B.11) (1− α)pˆH + αpˆL ≤ 1
Finally, since the analysis in section 3.1 applies, it follows that the relevant IC and
IR conditions are [after undoing the change of variables]:
(B.12) pˆH ≤ pˆL and
(B.13) pˆH
[
sH − α(vH − cL)
]
+ αpˆLsL ≥ 0.
This means that the mechanism design problem (B.4) becomes:
(B.4) E ≡ max
pˆH ,pˆL,tˆH ,tˆL
N
[
(1− α)pˆHsH + αpˆLsL
]
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Figure 15. The feasible set when M ≥ N and α ≤ α∗.
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Figure 16. The feasible set when M ≥ N and α > α∗
.
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subject to (B.9)–(B.13).
Figures 15 and 16 respectively illustrate the feasible sets for the soft buyer and
tough buyer cases. In both ﬁgures, the eﬃcient point is deﬁned uniquely by the
intersection of the three admissibility constraints; this is point B in both diagrams.
Figure 15 shows that when α ≤ α∗, the ﬁrst-best is achievable even with one
seller (and at least one buyer). Increasing the number of sellers while maintaining
the number of buyers at least equal to the number of sellers preserves eﬃciency.
When α > α∗, on the other hand, Figure 16 shows that the ﬁrst-best is no longer
achievable. Increasing the number of sellers (while maintaining the number of
buyers at least equal to the number of sellers) has no eﬀect on the ability to achieve
eﬃciency.
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